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1. Introduction  
     Codes of good governance vary remarkably across countries. This is because each code 
developed by a country is mainly issued to address certain corporate governance issues related 
to the country (Lucia & Liliana, 2010). Therefore, codes of good governance are different 
between nations owing to the impact of several institutional factors including cultural, political, 
legal, and economic factors (Cabeza-García et al., 2019). Similarly, good governance practices 
have been globally influenced by external market forces including international corporations, 
stock markets, and international bodies, such as the World Bank and IMF (Aguilera & Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). However, some scholars argued that researchers 
should consider many institutional factors to fully understand the differences in developing 
corporate governance codes around the world. These institutional perspectives include cultural, 
geographical, legal, and financial factors, which can eventually diversify good governance 
codes adopted in each country (Aras & Crowther, 2011).  
      This study examines the relationship between the key socio-economic factors and the 
identity and issuance of good governance codes worldwide. Although some scholars have tried 
to investigate the determinants and the total number of good governance codes developed by a 
country (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008; Haxhi & Van Ees, 2010), 
there is still need for additional research that explains the major reasons behind the differences 
among countries in the number of codes (issuance) and the issuer of codes (identity).  
     Concerning the legal factors, the country's legal system is one of the key factors that classify 
the country’s accounting system either under the Anglo-Saxon or the Continental Europe 
cluster. Anglo-Saxon accounting systems are generally set by professional organizations 
operating in the private sector. While, accounting systems of Continental European nations are 
set by the country’s regulations and they are very detailed and comprehensive, but less 
adaptable (Cerne, 2009). Unlike prior studies (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Haxhi & 
Van Ees, 2010; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008; Chan & Cheung, 2012), this paper has used a more 
detailed classification related to the legal origin measures, which breakdown the origins of 
different legal families into several groups rather than comparing common law and civil law 
origins to address the effect of the legal system on the number of governance codes or the issuer 
of first good governance codes, but it also explains the impact of incorporating common law 
and civil law families alongside religious law systems on good corporate governance codes. 
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      It could be maintained that the economic development degree of a country influences the 
adherence level to its rule of law, and not only by its legal system family. Therefore, rich 
nations exhibited a sound adherence to the rule of law, such as adopting international standards, 
while poor countries have experienced otherwise (Wood, 2016). Numerous environmental 
factors may influence the degree to which countries adhere to laws and regulations, such as the 
complexity of the legal system, financial cost, tax laws, political systems, inflation levels, and 
level of education. Hence, the consequences of nonadherence or inadequate adherence to laws 
and regulations differ across nations (Ali & Hwang, 2000; Mashayekhi & Mashayekh, 2008). 
Although the impact of legal origins on corporate governance codes has been empirically 
investigated by some scholars, (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008; 
Haxhi & Van Ees, 2010), they show different results for small samples and because of potential 
methodological and statistical weaknesses in their research. The association between good 
corporate governance and investor protection among countries has still not been investigated, 
since some scholars merely examined it at the firm level while others examined it from the 
stock markets perspective (Chen et al., 2009).  
      Some scholars argue that religious beliefs existing in a given country can fairly influence 
its legal system. Therefore, the interaction between the legal origin existing in a country and 
its religious beliefs may differ in various domains (Nieuwenhuis, 2012; Kleinman et al., 2014; 
Kleinman & Lin, 2017; Kleinman, et al., 2019). The interaction between religion and law and 
their effects on accounting innovations, such as good governance codes has been studied by 
very few scholars (Nakpodia et al., 2018). The religious culture plays a significant part in 
developing the corporate governance norms existing in a country. It also provides ethical 
standards in creating laws and influencing approaches to corporate governance. This is because 
religious beliefs affect personal values, and the way by which good governance practices are 
developed worldwide (Kim & Daniel, 2016; Volonte, 2015; Tricker & Tricker, 2015).  
     Unlike most prior CGGs studies (e.g., Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Haxhi & Van Ees, 
2010; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008) that have focused more on using the classifications of legal 
origins provided by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer (1997), who divided the worldwide 
legal origins into the following five groups: English common law, French civil law, German 
civil law, Scandinavian-civil law, and Socialist civil law. However, this study uses the more 
advanced legal origins classification provided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on the 
World Factbook website, which offers more concise descriptions of all major legal families 
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besides to those legal origins that incorporated into different religious beliefs, namely English 
common law, French civil law, Spanish civil law, Portuguese civil law, German civil law, 
Socialist civil law, English and religious law, French civil and Islamic law, English and Islamic 
law, and Mixed English and civil law. Moreover, using the more advanced legal systems 
classification prepared by the CIA helps to test the claim suggested by the institutional theory, 
which assumes that good governance codes developed in a country might be influenced by its 
socio-economic factors, such as legal, religious, cultural, political, and financial sources 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). Since this paper investigates the major reasons behind the 
diversity of good governance codes which might be affected by the differences of legal and 
religious values among countries, this study, therefore, uses the legal system's classification 
provided by the World Factbook website, which provides more accurate and detailed 
information about the interaction between the legal origin and religion for many countries. 
Additionally, using these various legal and religious law systems provided by the CIA helps to 
examine whether there are any significant differences between the influence of the key legal 
origin groups (common-law and civil-law families) on the identity and issuance of governance 
codes compared to those legal groups that have either common-law or civil-law origins 
alongside religious law systems, which can be merely found on the World Factbook website. 
     Previous scholars suggest that the World Bank's governance indicators are one of the main 
socio-economic factors that explain the differences in good governance codes among countries 
(Marino et al., 2016). Similarly, the worldwide governance indicators have been applied by 
previous scholars to examine the quality of governance, since they can provide an effective 
comparison and sound political analysis among nations Langbein & Knack, 2010). 
Empirically, the impact of the worldwide governance indicators on the adoption of good 
governance has been discussed by very few empirical studies (Daniel et al., 2012; Isukul & 
Chizea, 2015; Judge et al. 2008). Hence, this study investigates the influence of worldwide 
governance indicators on the identity and issuance of good governance codes, which have not 
been adequately investigated yet. 
     Regarding cultural influence, although the GLOBE cultural values provide a deep understanding 
of the cultural differences across nations, which researchers can apply to build across a wide range of 
international business topics (Venaik & Brewer, 2008), most cultural dimensions that were identified 
by previous studies, including the GLOBE cultural values have their origins in the dimensions of culture 
identified by Hofstede cultural values in 1980 (House et al., 2004; Essawi & Tilchin, 2013). 
Additionally, prior research was also used to present the organizational cultural values in a few societies, 
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while Hofstede's cultural website offers a complete view of cultural differences in many countries and 
helps to understand potential cultural barriers among nations (Hofstede, 1980). This study, therefore, 
examines the impact of Hofstede’s cultural values on the identity and issuance of good 
governance codes, since a few empirical studies have examined the relationship between 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and the adoption of good governance codes at the macro 
country level (Haxhi & Van Ees, 2010; Judge et al., 2008; Daniel et al., 2012), whereas most 
prior studies have examined the relationship between corporate governance and Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions at the micro-level (Chan & Cheung, 2012).  
     Further, this study has employed Hofstede cultural values to keep consistency with prior empirical 
research and to address the gaps in the extant literature, which applied individual cultural dimensions 
to examine the relationship between Hofstede cultural dimensions and good governance codes (Haxhi 
and Van Ees, 2010; Chan & Cheung, 2012; Matoussi & Jardak, 2012; Daniel et al., 2012). Hence, this 
study provides a more comprehensive analysis by including the four key Hofstede cultural dimensions 
to investigate the impact of cultural values on the cross-national diversity of governance codes. 
Furthermore, most previous studies were conducted by using small samples for a short time horizon 
and inadequate methodological ways to explain the phenomenon under investigation. This study, 
therefore, has covered 3,200 observations for 160 countries over the period 1995-2014 intending to 
provide a more comprehensive analysis and offer a better explanation for the impact of Hofstede's 
cultural values on the identity and issuance of good governance codes worldwide. 
     Regarding the relationship between good governance codes and financial consequences, 
even though the influence of some financial factors on good governance codes was studied by 
some scholars, such as FDI, previous studies have shown mixed results because they used small 
sample sizes, which may affect the outcomes of their research findings (Mukherjee et al., 2012; 
Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). This study, therefore, examines the impact of four key 
socio-economic factors including legal, cultural, political, and financial indicators on two 
related good governance issues: the number of codes developed in a country (issuance) and the 
issuer (identity) who developed the first governance codes in a country.  
    Accordingly, this paper makes several contributions to the current literature on corporate 
governance codes. First, there is an acute dearth of research on the empirical research 
conducted to investigate the effect of key socio-economic factors on the identity and issuance 
of good governance codes that applied to a small sample size and short time horizon up to 
2007. (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008; Haxhi & Van Ees, 2010). 
Therefore, this research seeks to extend the previous research conducted on the reasons behind 
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differences in identity and issuance of governance codes among countries. This study, 
therefore, extends the number of countries and the time horizon used by contemporary 
empirical studies to include the most recent period spanning 1995-2014. Second, this research 
investigates the influence of four key socio-economic factors on the identity and issuance of 
good governance codes, including legal factors, cultural dimensions, governance indicators, 
and financial factors, which have not yet been jointly included in one empirical study so far. 
Hence, this study provides more information about the major reasons for differences in identity 
and issuance of good governance codes worldwide. Third, this research contributes to the 
current literature by using advanced statistical analyses, including a fixed-effect model to 
investigate the relationship between the number of codes and the socio-economic factors 
besides multinomial logistic regression to examine the impact of the socio-economic factors 
on the issuer of first governance codes. While recent studies suffer from several methodological 
and statistical weaknesses and have shown mixed findings (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 
Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008; Mukherjee et al., 2012). Finally, and most importantly, the 
aforementioned studies have only described the issuer of first governance codes issued in a 
country up to 1999 without examining their relationship with the socio-economic factors of the 
adopting countries. (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Therefore, this study examines the 
link between the issuer and the fundamental socio-economic factors: legal, cultural, political, 
and financial indicators for a large sample and up to 2014. 
2. Literature Review 
   This section reviews the theoretical and empirical literature conducted by prior studies. 
2.1 Institutional Theory  
 Institutional theory has been applied to explain the diversity of good governance codes 
among countries. This is because the framework of institutional theory has been extended to 
not just include how the legal system reduces agency conflicts, but also to look at other socio-
economic factors that drive the diversity of corporate governance codes across countries 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). Therefore, in line with existing studies (Aguilera & Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008; Gerner-Beuerle, 2014), this study applies institutional 
theory to examine the main reasons behind the diversity in identity and issuance of good 
governance codes worldwide. Institutional theory suggests that the apparent diversity in 
corporate governance codes emerge from the variety of national institutional and cultural 
factors across countries (Daniel et al., 2012). According to institutional theory, many countries 
have voluntarily developed new codes of good governance and the number of these good 
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practices has considerably increased across countries to satisfy the efficiency needs imposed 
by internal parties, such as political, cultural, and legal system, besides, to comply with the 
legitimacy forces imposed by external parties, such as foreign investors and government 
liberalization (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). 
     Further, the number and content of good governance codes have been influenced by three 
isomorphic pressures, including coercive, mimetic, and normative that are proposed by 
institutional theory as a response to the needs of different stakeholders, Hence, the more 
stakeholders involved, the more good governance codes developed (Aguilera & Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004). Accordingly, if a country has adopted only one governance code, this means 
that there is just one type of stakeholder groups in the country (Giulio, 2012). However, 
Aguilera and Jackson (2010) argued that each country in the world has its social system, which 
influences the number and content of the corporate governance system in the country. For 
instance, the ownership structure is fully owned by families or the government in some 
countries, while other countries have dispersed ownership owned by shareholders.  
    According to institutional theory, adopting good governance codes requires adjusting to the 
institutional factors of a country to satisfy the needs of its stakeholders. Therefore, countries 
need to align their socio-economic culture with the needs of their investors to attract more 
foreign investors (Daniel et al., 2012). Therefore, Anglo-American countries with strong laws 
for shareholders protection rights are more likely to develop good governance codes for 
investors, since these nations seek to emphasize the interests of their shareholders (Krenn, 
2014). Moreover, the institutional theory suggests that coercive pressure emerges from internal 
forces, such as legal and cultural forces which enforce a society to develop and apply certain 
standards (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Similarly, countries may adopt or develop new 
governance codes as a response to the internal coercive pressure that emerges from internal 
parties to attract foreign investors through improving the efficiency of their good governance 
codes. However, additional countries may respond to the normative or mimetic pressures arise 
from external forces such as financial markets, governments, and local associations (Zattoni & 
Cuomo, 2008). However, Tsamenyi et al. (2006) argued that the interaction between external 
and internal institutional forces drives that shapes of the corporate governance system of a 
country. This is because corporations either reply to normative isomorphism that arises from 
the legal party to enhance their efficiency, or to respond to coercive isomorphism that emerges 
from the capital market forces. 
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2.2 Empirical Literature  
    Concerning legal factors, previous studies found that countries with a civil legal origin and 
weak shareholder protection rights are negatively and significantly associated with the good 
governance codes. While, countries with English common law origin are positively and 
significantly associated with the codes of good governance (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 
Haxhi & Van Ees, 2010; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008; Chan & Cheung, 2012). For example, Haxhi 
and Ees (2010) examined the impact of legal origins on good governance codes by using a 
sample of 67 countries, and they found a positive and significant correlation between the 
adoption of good governance and the Anglo-Saxon legal origin. By covering 44 countries, 
Zattoni and Cuomo (2008) reported that common law countries are more likely to develop and 
adopt corporate governance codes, whereas civil law countries had fewer governance codes as 
a result of the influence of external forces. Regarding the protection of shareholders' rights, 
prior studies reported that countries with a common-law origin are more likely to have strong 
shareholder protection than civil law countries (Matoussi & Jardak, 2012). Similarly, by 
gathering data for 49 countries Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) argued that countries with 
strong laws for shareholders' rights are more likely to develop codes of good governance to 
increase the country's efficiency. However, Berglof and Claessens (2006) stated that countries 
with weak laws for shareholders' rights establish more codes to compensate for the lack of their 
legal systems. Hence, this research posits the following hypothesis. 
H1: Countries with common law origin and strong laws for shareholders’ rights are more 
likely to have a large number of good governance codes 
    Regarding political indicators, very few empirical studies have been examined so far to study 
the impact of worldwide governance indicators on the codes of good governance, such as 
political stability (Daniel et al., 2012; Isukul & Chizea, 2015), government effectiveness, and 
control of corruption (Daniel et al., 2012). For example, Isukul and Chizea (2015) studied the 
impact of the worldwide governance indicators on corporate governance systems of three 
countries: Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt. The findings of this study reported that corporate 
governance practices cannot exist in the presence of a higher level of corruption and political 
instability, alongside the presence of lower levels of government quality and regulatory 
effectiveness. Another study conducted by Judge et al. (2008) reported that the higher the 
corruption level in a country, the less legitimacy of corporate governance codes. Additionally, 
some previous studies examined the relationship between good governance codes and 
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government liberalization, and they found a positive, but insignificant relationship between 
them (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Hence, this study suggests the following hypothesis: 
H2. Countries with a high level of governance indicators are more likely to have a large 
number of good governance codes 
    The relationship between Hofstede's cultural dimensions and good governance codes has 
been empirically examined by some scholars (Haxhi and Van Ees, 2010; Chan & Cheung, 
2012; Matoussi & Jardak, 2012; Daniel et al., 2012). For instance, by selecting a sample of 67 
countries, Haxhi and Van Ees (2010) found that only the individualism cultural dimension was 
positively and significantly related to the number of codes developed in a country. Similarly, 
Chan and Cheung (2012) reported that the individualism index is positively and significantly 
associated with the number of good governance codes adopted. In the same way, Haxhi and 
Van Ees (2010) stated that there is a negative and significant relationship between the power 
distance index in a country and the number of good governance codes developed by the 
country. Whereas the relationship is negatively, but insignificant between uncertainty 
avoidance existed in a country and the number of good governance codes. However, Chan and 
Cheung (2012) reported that the masculinity and uncertainty avoidance cultural dimensions 
were both negatively and significantly correlated with the number of good governance codes. 
While, power distance cultural index was negatively, but insignificantly associated with the 
number of governance codes adopted by the country. However, Matoussi and Jardak (2012) 
found an insignificant relationship between the masculinity cultural index and the number of 
codes adopted by the country. Therefore, this research suggests the following hypothesis: 
H3: Countries with Anglo-Saxon cultural dimensions are more likely to have a large number 
of good governance codes 
   Concerning financial needs, very few scholars have studied the relationship between FDI and 
good governance codes and they showed mixed outcomes since some scholars found a positive 
correlation between these two factors while others show a negative relationship between good 
governance codes and foreign direct investment in the country. (Gerner-Beuerle, 2014; 
Mukherjee et al., 2011). For example, Gerner-Beuerle (2014) showed that there is a significant 
positive relationship between codes of good governance and FDI in a country. However, 
Mukherjee et al. (2011) reported that the relationship between the presence of a foreign direct 
investment in a country and its good governance codes is still ambiguous. In terms of financial 
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aid, no attention has been paid to investigate the relationship between good governance and 
financial aid. Hence, this study examines the association between good governance and 
financial aid. Developing good governance codes can help countries to improve their economic 
and financial situations. In this vein, the IMF works with its member countries to enhance good 
governance and combat corruption. Therefore, this study posits the following hypothesis: 
H4: Countries with a large number of good governance codes are more likely to have higher 
levels of FDI and financial aids 
3. Research Methodology  
  This section discusses the research method and research design in conducting this study.   
3.1 Sample Selection 
    Although the non-probability sampling technique has a lot of limitations, it is also useful 
especially when the population is fairly large and randomization is not possible (Etikan et 
al., 2016). However, the need for using a non-probability sampling (non-random) 
technique depends on the research under investigation. For instance, a non-probability 
convenient sampling method is more accurate, especially if large data are available about 
the target population and a big unbiased sample is selected. Consequently, the right way 
to avoid the effect of sampling error and risk of selection bias of using non-probability 
convenient sampling is by choosing a large sample that represents the population, thus 
enhance the ability to generalize the results (Acharya et al., 2013). 
    The sample size for this study has included 160 countries from different legal families, 
including English common law, civil law origins, and mixed legal systems. The sample is 
selected by using a non-probability convenience sampling technique. The sample size 
chosen has been reduced from 185 to 160 countries because of data availability limitations 
and missing data were excluded owing to the lack of information necessary for this 
research. Although the sample selected was reduced, it still represents approximately 86% 
of the target population, which increases the generalisability and validity of this research. The 
chosen sample size is still larger than the sample sizes used by previous studies, such as 
49 countries by Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004), 67 countries by Haxhi and Ees (2010), 
44 countries in Zattoni and Cuomo (2008). The time frame for this study has covered the period 
between 1995 and 2014, which extends the time horizon used by the most recent prior studies 
published in 2010 conducted by Haxhi and Ees (2010), which covered data up to the end of 
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2007. Table 1 present the sample selected for this study based on the first code issued in 160 
countries up to 2014.  
Please insert Table (1) about here 
3.2 Data Collection, variables, and measurements 
   This section explains the definitions and measurements of all variables included in this study.  
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
    The two dependent variables included in this study are the number of governance codes 
developed in a country (issuance) alongside the issuer (identity) who issued the first code in a 
country both variables are collected from the European Corporate Governance Institute 
(ECGI), which are consistent with the measurement methods used by prior research studies 
(Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Haxhi & Ees, 2010; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). Overall, 
Table 2 presents the definitions, measurements, and data sources for the dependent variables.  
3.2.2 Independent variables 
   There are four independent variables have been used in this study to examine the impact of 
socio-economic factors on the identity and issuance of good governance codes worldwide. The 
first explanatory variable is legal factors, which include two legal proxies, namely the legal 
origin (LEGORIG), and the strength of investor protection (STRIVPR). The legal origin 
variable is divided into the following legal families provided by the World Factbook, including 
English common law (ENGCLAW), French civil law (FRENCIVIL), Spanish civil law 
(SPANCIVIL), Portuguese civil law (PORTCIVIL), German civil law (GERMCIVIL), Socialist 
civil law (SOCIALCIVIL), English and religious law (ENGNDREG), French civil and Islamic 
Sharia (FRENDISLM), English and Islamic Sharia (ENGNDISLM), Mixed English and civil 
law (ENGNDCIVIL). The legal origin is a categorical variable, hence, the dummy coding 
technique was used by recording the categorical variable into a series of dichotomous variables. 
For example, the legal origin is recorded on a dummy coding system (0-1), where one indicates 
that a country has a certain legal origin and zero otherwise. Table 2 summarizes the definitions, 
and measurements of all legal origin families included in this study. 
     The second independent variable is the worldwide governance indicators, which involve 
three governance proxies: voice and accountability (VOCAACC), regularity quality 
(REGQULT), and control of corruption (CONCORR). The third explanatory variable is 
Hofstede's cultural dimensions, which include four cultural indexes: power distance index 
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(POWDIST), individualism index (INDIVID), masculinity index (MASCULI), and uncertainty 
avoidance (UNCAVOD). The fourth independent variable is financial factors, which 
encompass two financial proxies: foreign direct investment (FORDINV), and financial aid 
(FINAAID). Only four cultural dimensions were selected as a result of the limited availability 
of the other two cultural indexes, namely indulgence versus self-restraint and long-term versus 
short-term orientation. Similarly, only three worldwide governance indicators have been 
included in the module because of the multicollinearity problem among the other three 
governance indicators, namely political stability, government effectiveness, and rule of law. 
Overall, Table 2 shows the definitions, measurements, and sources of the key social-economic 
variables included in this study.   
Please insert Table (2) about here 
3.3 Data Analysis Techniques  
      This study has included two types of dependent variables. The first dependent variable is 
naturally continuous, namely the number of governance codes developed in a country 
(issuance). Therefore, multivariate OLS regression is the right regression model that can 
analyze the continuous outcome variable. However, the second outcome variable is the issuer 
of first codes in a country (identity), which is categorical and includes the following seven 
categories: no codes were issued, stock exchange, government, directors’ association, 
managers’ association professional association, and investors’ association. Hence, multinomial 
logistic regression is the right statistical method that can analyze categorical data which 
involves over two groups when the order is not required between distinct groups (Bourguignon 
et al., 2007). The data have been analyzed by using Stata Software and the four OLS 
assumptions (normality, linearity multicollinearity, and heteroscedasticity) were checked and 
corrected by using robust standard errors. Equation (1) shows multiple linear regression, while 
equation (2) presents the logistic regression model.  
OLS Model Equation (1):  
𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡= 𝛼0 +  𝛽1 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝑂𝑅𝐼𝐺𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑉𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽3 𝑉𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4 𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑄𝑈𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽6 𝑃𝑂𝑊𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽7 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8 𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑈𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 +   𝛽9 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 +
  𝛽10 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡          (1) 




]=𝛼0 +  𝛽1 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝑂𝑅𝐼𝐺𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑉𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝑉𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4 𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑄𝑈𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑃𝑂𝑊𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8 𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑈𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 +
  𝛽10 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡          (2) 
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4. Results and Discussion 
    This section discusses the findings obtained from running different statistical techniques, 
including descriptive statistics, correlation, and multiple linear regression analysis. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistic Analysis 
    Table 3 summaries the descriptive analysis of all variables included in the regression models. 
Table 3 shows that the codes range from 0 to 37, where 37 is the highest number of codes 
issued by 2014 with an average of two codes issued by the selected countries. Table 3 indicates 
that there are six types of identities, who issued the first codes in a country in addition to the 
seventh group which includes countries where no codes were issued, and the data ranges from 
0 to 6. These six types of identities are consistent with the type of identity used by prior studies 
(Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008), including the stock exchange, 
government, directors’ association, managers’ association, professional and investors’ 
associations. The data related to English common law origin ranges from 0 to 1, which indicates 
that there are two main types of legal origins including English common and civil law origins, 
and this is in line with the legal origins applied by previous studies (Aguilera & Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004; Haxhi & Ees, 2010; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). Table 3 presents the descriptive 
statistics of the other nine classification for a mixture of common law or civil law origins with 
religious-cultural beliefs that may determine the governance codes existing in a country due to 
the interaction between the legal system and its religious culture, and they range from 0 to 1.     
Please insert Table (3) about here 
    Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of all independent variables included in this study, 
which covers 3,200 observations for 160 countries. The descriptive results show varying 
degrees of distributional properties in the research variables. For example, Financial aid 
(FINAAID) shows the lowest level of variability among the other selected variables with an 
average of 0.45 and a standard deviation of 0.85. However, FORDINV has the highest level of 
variability among the research variables with an average of 8.56 and a standard deviation of 
32.5. Similarly, POWDIST has a medium-variance distribution among the research variables 
included in the regression models with an average of 6.779 and a standard deviation of 1.829. 
Whereas, UNCAVOD shows the second-medium level of variation among the selected research 




4.2 Correlation Analysis  
    Table 4 shows the results of the Pearson correlation matrix applied to examine the bivariate 
relationship between all variables included in this study. Specifically, Table 4 shows that the 
number of codes issued in a country by 2014 (ISSUANCE) and the type of identity issued first 
codes (IDENTITY) both is positively associated with the following socio-economic factors: 
legal origins (LEGORIG), the strength of investor protection (STRIVPR), voice and 
accountability (VOCAACC), regularity quality (REGQULT), control of corruption 
(CONCORR), individualism index (INDIVID), masculinity index (MASCULI), and foreign 
direct investment (FORDINV). However, Table 4 indicates that the number of codes issued in 
a country by 2014 (ISSUANCE) and the type of identity issued first codes (IDENTITY) are both 
negatively correlated with two Hofstede's cultural dimensions, namely power distance index 
(POWDIST), uncertainty avoidance (UNCAVOD), while financial aids (FINAAID) is positively 
associated with the number of codes in a country and negatively with the type of identity who 
issued the first codes in the country. 
Please insert Table (4) about here 
4.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
     Table 5 displays the results of the multiple linear regressions model used to examine the 
relationship between the number of governance codes issued in the country and its socio-
economic factors. The diagnostics of Table 5 show that the p-values of F- test for the OLS 
linear regression model are statistically significant at a 1% level, indicating that the OLS model 
can significantly provide a better fit to the data than the model that includes only intercepts. 
Additionally, Table 5 indicates that the adjusted-R2 value of the OLS regression model is 
0.419. This means that at least 41.9% of the variation in the number of good governance codes 
can be explained by the four socio-economic factors included in the OLS regression model.  
4.3.1 Legal factors 
     The findings in Table 5 indicate that the English common law origin and strong laws of 
investor protection both have a positive and significant association with the number of codes 
issued in a country. This result is consistent with the outcomes reported by previous empirical 
studies (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Haxhi & Van Ees, 2010; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008; 
Chan & Cheung, 2012). This finding supports hypothesis 1, which assumes that countries with 
a common-law origin and strong laws for shareholders’ rights are more likely to have a large 
number of codes. This result supports the institutional theory, which suggests that countries 
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with strong laws for investor protection are more likely to have a higher number of governance 
codes as a response to the coercive pressure emerge from internal parties such as the legal 
system for efficiency reasons (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Moreover, OLS and fixed-
effect models of Table 5 both show a positive and significant relationship between civil law 
origins and the number of codes issued merely in a country with FRENCIVIL, SPANCIVIL, 
and PORTCIVIL. Similarly, it also indicates a positive and significant association between the 
number of governance codes and mixed English and religious law origins, namely 
ENGNDISLM  and ENGNDCIVIL as a result of the influence of English legal origin existing 
in those countries. However, Table 5 shows that countries with SOCIALCIVIL and 
ENGNDREG tend to have a lower number of codes, while the results are insignificant for the 
other origins GERMCIVIL and FRENDISLM, which are mostly adopted by Arabic nations.  
4.3.2 Worldwide governance indicators 
     OLS regression and fixed-effect models of Table 5 both show a positive and significant 
association between the regulatory quality index and the number of governance codes issued 
in a country. This result supports hypothesis 2, which proposes that countries with a high level 
of worldwide governance indicators are more likely to have a large number of good governance 
codes. This finding is in line with institutional theory, which suggests that counties with strong 
governance indicators are more prone to have higher levels of good governance codes as a 
reaction to the coercive pressure arises from internal parties, such as governments (Duh, 2017). 
However, OLS regression and fixed-effect models of Table 5 report that there is a positive but 
insignificant association between the number of good governance codes issued in a country 
and the control of corruption index. This finding is consistent with the outcomes reported by 
some scholars, who report that corporate governance can be used as an effective anti-corruption 
tool, since it can enhance transparency and accountability, thus improve their political 
legitimacy (Isukul & Chizea, 2015). However, this result contradicts hypothesis 2, which 
proposes that countries with a high level of control of corruption are more likely to have a large 
number of good governance codes.   
Please insert Table (5) about here 
4.3.3 Hofstede cultural dimensions 
     OLS regression and fixed-effect models of Table 5 shows a negative and significant 
association between power distance cultural index and the number of codes issued in a country. 
This finding is consistent with previous studies (Haxhi & Van Ees, 2010). This result supports 
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hypothesis 3, which suggests that countries with Anglo-Saxon cultural dimensions, namely a 
lower level of power distance index are more likely to have a large number of good governance 
codes. This result is in line with institutional theory, which assumes that coercive pressure 
emerges from internal pressure, such as cultural forces, which enforce a society to develop and 
apply certain standards (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). However, the OLS regression model of 
Table 5 indicates that the uncertainty avoidance cultural dimension is positively but 
insignificantly correlated with the number of codes developed in a country, which led to the 
rejection of hypothesis H3. This result is in line with the finding stated by some previous 
research (Haxhi and Van Ees (2010). This insignificant relationship shown is consistent with 
the results reported by some prior empirical studies (Haxhi & Van Ees, 2010).   
    Further, the positive results shown in Table 5 between individualism cultural index and the 
number of good governance codes issued in a country led to the acceptance of H3, which 
proposes that countries with Anglo-Saxon cultural dimensions, namely higher levels of 
individualism cultural index are more likely to have a large number of good governance codes. 
Moreover, the positive results shown in Table 5 between masculinity cultural index and the 
number of codes developed by a country led to the acceptance of hypothesis H3, which suggests 
that countries with Anglo-Saxon cultural dimensions, namely higher level of masculinity 
cultural index are more likely to have a large number of good governance codes. These results 
are consistent with the findings reported by some prior studies (e.g., Haxhi and Van Ees, 2010; 
Chan & Cheung, 2012). The institutional theory is also supported by the positive relationship 
identified, since institutional theory argues that countries tend to develop good governance 
codes to satisfy their efficiency need imposed by internal parties, such as cultural forces 
(Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). 
4.3.4 Financial indicators 
    OLS regression and fixed-effect models of Tables 5 both show that the number of good 
governance codes developed in a country is positively and significantly correlated with 
financial indicators, namely FDI and foreign financial aids given to a government of a country 
by one of the international bodies such United Nations, World Bank, and IMF. The significant 
positive relationship shown is consistent with the results reported by most prior empirical 
studies (Gerner-Beuerle, 2014). The institutional theory is supported by the positive 
relationship identified, which assumes countries tend to develop good governance codes to 
satisfy the needs of their foreign investors and to comply with the legitimacy forces imposed 
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by external parties as responding to the normative or mimetic pressures arise from external 
forces such as financial markets to obtain more financial sources (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). Accordingly, the positive results verified by both OLS 
regression and fixed-effect models of Table 5 led to the acceptance of H4, which suggests that 
countries with a large number of good governance codes are more likely to acquire higher 
levels of FDI and financial aids provided for countries by different international organizations 
around the world, which most of them require a country to have good governance codes to 
obtain financial aid. 
4.4 Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis 
      Table 6 shows that the Pseudo-R2 value of 0.314 is greater than 20%, which implies that 
the fit of the multinomial logistic model is good. Table 6 shows that most governance codes 
issued by the coercive stock exchange group were from English common law countries with 
strong laws for investor protection and from those countries with mixed legal origins, which 
include English common law alongside civil or religious culture. This result is in line with the 
expectations of prior studies (Duh, 2017), who reported that most countries tend to develop 
governance codes through the stock markets since they can enforce listed companies to 
mandatory disclose of compliance with their good governance codes in addition to their 
abilities to promote good governance codes regularly. Moreover, Table 6 shows a positive and 
significant association between voice and accountability index and good governance codes that 
were obtained by the normative and mimetic groups in addition to one coercive group, namely 
the investors’ association group. However, Table 6 shows a negative and significant correlation 
between the regulatory quality index and good governance codes that were issued by the three 
normative groups, including governments, directors’ associations, and professional 
associations. While, Table 6 shows a positive and significant correlation between the regulatory 
quality index and good governance codes that were issued by the two coercive groups, 
including stock exchanges and investors’ association. Additionally, Table 6 indicates that 
countries that issued their first codes of good governance by the two coercive groups (stock 
exchanges, and investors’ association) suffer from a significant level of corruption. While 
countries that issued their first governance codes by the normative group (government) are 
characterized by having strong levels of control of corruption. 
Please insert Table (6) about here 
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    Regarding cultural dimensions, Table 6 indicates that most countries that issued their first 
good governance codes by the stock exchange group have European culture, which includes 
higher levels of power distance and uncertainty avoidance alongside lower levels of 
masculinity index. Table 6 reports that most countries that issued their first good governance 
codes by the investor's group have an Anglo-Saxon culture, which includes higher levels of 
individualism and masculinity cultural index, alongside lower levels of power distance and 
uncertainty avoidance. Table 6 shows that most countries that issued their first good 
governance codes by the government group have a Scandinavian culture, which includes lower 
levels of power distance and masculinity index alongside strong uncertainty avoidance and 
individualism cultural index. Moreover, Table 6 indicates that most countries that issued their 
first good governance codes by the directors’ association group have the culture of western 
Asian countries, which are characterized by high levels of individualism cultural index and 
strong masculinity cultural index alongside lower levels of power distance and uncertainty 
avoidance cultural index. Table 6 shows that most countries that issued their first good 
governance codes by the professional association group have the culture of Latin American 
countries, which are characterized by large power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance 
with high levels of masculinity cultural index besides lower levels of individualism index.  
    Further, Table 6 indicates that most countries that issued their first good governance codes 
by the managers’ association group have the culture of eastern Asian countries, which are 
characterized by large power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance cultural index 
alongside lower levels of and individualism and masculinity index. These findings are in line 
with prior research, which revealed that the type of issuers of codes is correlated to certain 
cultural beliefs in a country. For instance, countries with unequal power distribution have the 
most developed stock markets as a result of good reputations established with investors through 
their codes issued by their developed capital markets (Haxhi & Van Ees, 2010). 
     Table 6 reports that most countries that issued their good governance codes for all types of 
issuers except managers’ association group that have received significant levels of financial 
resources from FDI but insignificant resources as financial aid. This finding is consistent with 
the expectation reported by previous studies (Haxhi & Aguilera, 2017), who stated that 
policymakers tend to develop codes of good governance as a signal to foreign investors about 





The relationship between socioeconomic factors and the issuer and identity of good 
governance codes has been rarely studied by very few empirical research (Aguilera & Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008; Haxhi & Van Ees, 2010), due to their limited 
understanding of what are the main reasons behind the adoption of good governance codes. 
This study, therefore, aims to investigate the impact of four socio-economic factors: legal, 
cultural, political, and financial factors on the number of good codes issued alongside the issuer 
of the first codes in a given country.  
The finding of this research reports that the number of good governance codes is positively 
and significantly associated with common law countries with an Anglo-Saxon culture and 
strong laws for investor protection rights to meet the efficiency needs imposed by three internal 
forces imposed by legal, political, and cultural systems. Moreover, countries that have mixed 
legal origin including English common law besides civil or religious origins have also 
developed a substantial number of governance codes. Furthermore, this study indicates that 
countries with higher levels of the regulatory quality index tend to develop a large number of 
good governance codes as a response to the external pressures imposed by three types of 
issuers: stock exchanges, governments, and professional associations to gain legal legitimacy. 
Moreover, this study concluded that there is a positive and significant association between the 
number of good governance codes developed by all types of good governance codes issuers 
and the external financial resources, including financial aids and FDI, indicating that investors 
highly trust good governance codes developed by all code’s issuer types.   
    Additionally, this study revealed that countries with higher levels of the regulatory quality 
index tend to issue their first good governance codes for legitimate reasons as a response to the 
external forces that emerged from their coercive groups, namely stock exchanges and investor’s 
associations. Besides, this study shows that only countries where their first governance codes 
were issued by the government group have experienced higher levels of corruption control for 
efficiency reasons as a reaction to the internal pressure emerged from the normative group. 
Likewise, this research indicates that only countries issued their first codes by the coercive 
pressure imposed by stock markets, and investors’ associations are characterized by weak 
levels of control of corruption. Hence, most countries tend to issue good governance codes to 
govern their codes issued by the normative groups, namely government and directors’ 
association groups, thus use them as effective anti-corruption tools to reduce corruption levels. 
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This study also found that the issuer of good governance codes is primarily associated with 
certain cultural beliefs existing in a country.  
    This study provides important implications for different groups. Firstly, it offers implications 
for policymakers especially in civil law countries with weak laws for investor protection rights 
to issue new governance codes to protect investors' rights to increase investors’ trust, which 
triggers to obtain more FDI. Secondly, this study also provides important implications for 
governments in countries with higher levels of corruption to issue new governance codes to 
use them as an anti-corruption tool to govern the association between stock exchanges, 
governments, and investors, since investors trust good governance codes issued by all code’s 
issuer types. Thirdly, this study indicated that countries with Anglo-Saxon culture tend to 
protect investor rights due to the trust between corporate management and investors. An 
important social implication can be also extracted from the findings of this paper. Specifically,  
the governments in Latin American countries need to perform a pro-active policy of 
transforming national culture because societies with a higher level of uncertainty avoidance 
culture suffer from a lack of trust (Hofstede, 2001). Therefore, governments in Latin American 
countries can change the culture of their nations by increasing the cooperation between their 
local and multinational organizations by issuing rules which could increase the trust between 
institutions and investors. 
     Although this study has provided important implications for several parties, some 
limitations are acknowledged to address the potential weaknesses of conducting this study. 
Firstly, this study included a sample of 160 countries due to the limited availability of needed 
data. Secondly, this research has included only four socio-economic factors: legal cultural, 
political, and financial factors, future studies may include other socio-economic factors, such 
as economic growth and stock market development. Thirdly, this study has covered seven types 
of issuers that issued the first codes in a country, including no codes issued, stock exchanges, 
investors’ association, government directors’ association, professional association, and 
managers’ association, further studies might investigate all types of the issuer during a certain 
time rather than those associations that issued the first codes in a country. Finally, this study 
applies the theoretical framework proposed by institutional theory to explain the reasons behind 
the diversity of identity and issuance of good governance codes among nations, future studies 
may employ other theoretical frameworks, such as resource dependence theory and stakeholder 
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theory to explain the different perspective of examining the diversity of identity and issuance 
of good governance codes.  
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Table 1: Codes of good governance based on the issuer of the first code in 160 countries around the world over the period from 1995 to 2014 
No codes were 
issued by 2014 







Afghanistan Armenia Kuwait Poland Denmark Albania Dominica Nepal Bangladesh Argentina Algeria 
Angola Australia Kyrgyzstan 
 




Egypt Austria Canada 












Latvia Saudi Arabia Malaysia 
 






Iraq Bulgaria Libya Serbia Norway Belize Ethiopia Romania Indonesia Jamaica Kenya 
Nicaragua China Lithuania Singapore 
 
 Benin Gabon Rwanda Iran Lebanon Togo 
Niger Croatia Luxembourg Slovakia  Botswana Gambia, The Senegal Japan Mozambique Tunisia 
Nigeria Cyprus Macedonia Slovenia  Brazil Guatemala Sierra 
Leone 



















 Fiji Mexico Switzerland  Burma  Honduras Suriname Spain    




 Burundi Jordan Swaziland  Sweden   
 Georgia Montenegro Tanzania  Cambodia Laos Tajikistan United States 
of America 
  
 Ghana Netherlands Thailand   Cameroon Lesotho Tonga    
 Greece 
 
New Zealand Turkey  Cape Verde Liberia Trinidad 
and Tobago 
   
 Hong Kong 
 
Oman Uganda  Central 
African 
Republic 
Madagascar Uruguay    
 Hungary Pakistan Ukraine  Chad Mali Vietnam    
 Iceland Panama UAE  Chile Mauritania Zimbabwe    
 Kazakhstan Peru The UK  Costa Rica Mongolia     
   Zambia  Congo, 
Democratic 
Morocco     
     Cote d'Ivoire Namibia     
     8  58  5  60  13 8 8 
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Table 2: Summary of definitions, measurements and data sources for all variables included in this study 
Variables’ Definitions Measurements Data Sources 
Dependent Variables 
The number of codes 
developed (issuance) 
 
The number of codes developed in a country over 
the period 1995-2014  
ECGI Available from 
https://ecgi.global/content/codes 
The type of issuer (identity) The type of issuer, which includes six groups as 
follows 
0= No codes were issued 
1= Stock exchange 
2= Government 
3= Directors’ association 
4= Managers’ association 
5= Professional association 
6= Investors’ association 
ECGI Available from 
https://ecgi.global/content/codes 
Independent Variables 
Legal origin 1 = English common law, and 0 otherwise 
1 = French civil law, and 0 otherwise 
1 = Spanish civil law, and 0 otherwise 
1 = Portuguese civil law, and 0 otherwise 
1 = German civil law, and 0 otherwise 
1 = Socialist civil law, and 0 otherwise 
1 = English and religious law, and 0 otherwise 
1 = French civil and Islamic law, and 0 otherwise 
1 = English and Islamic law, and 0 otherwise 
1 = Mixed English and civil law, and 0 otherwise 
The World Factbook about civil and 
common law countries available from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/t
he-world-factbook/fields/2100.html 
Strength of investor 
protection 
Strength of Investor Protection Index on a 0-10 
scale, ten refers to a higher level of investor 
protection and zero otherwise  
World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Index available at 
http://reports.weforum.org/global-
competitiveness-index-2017-2018 
   
Voice and accountability It measures freedom of the press over the period 
1995 to 2014 and it has a scale from -2.5 to 2.5  
The Worldwide Governance Indicators 




Regularity Quality It measures the quality of the regulatory 
environment in a country over the period 1995 to 
2014 and it has a scale from -2.5 to 2.5   
The WGI project available at 
https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wg
i/#home 
Control of corruption It measures the level of corruption in a country over 
the period 1995 to 2014 and it has a scale from -2.5 
to 2.5.   
The WGI project available at 
https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wg
i/#home 
Power distance index It measures the extent to which the power is 
distributed unequally within an organization, which 
it has a scale of (0-10) 
Geert Hofstede website for cultural 
dimensions available from  
https://geerthofstede.com/research-and-
vsm/dimension-data-matrix/ 
Individualism index It measures the degree to which people in a 
community are integrated into groups. which it has 
a scale of (0-10) 
Geert Hofstede website for cultural 
dimensions available from  
https://geerthofstede.com/research-and-
vsm/dimension-data-matrix/ 
Masculinity index It measures the gap between masculine societies 
and feminine societies which share views equally 
with men, which it has a scale of (0-10) 
Geert Hofstede website for cultural 





It measures the tolerance of a community about 
ambiguity and unexpected events, which has a scale 
of (0-10) 
Geert Hofstede website for cultural 
dimensions available from  
https://geerthofstede.com/research-and-
vsm/dimension-data-matrix/ 
Foreign direct investment Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, 
current US$) 
The World Bank Data Available at  
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.
KLT.DINV.CD.WD 
Financial aids Net official development assistance and official aid 
received (current US$) 
International Development Statistics 





Table 3: Descriptive analysis of socio-economic factors, issuance, and identity of CGGs  
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
ISSUANCE 3,200 1.614 3.158 0 37 
IDENTITY 3,200 1.431 1.675 0 6 
ENGCLAW 3,200 0.150 0.357 0 1 
FRENCIVIL 3,200 0.157 0.363 0 1 
SPANCIVIL 3,200 0.100 0.300 0 1 
PORTCIVIL  3,200 0.038 0.191 0 1 
GERMCIVIL  3,200 0.082 0.274 0 1 
SOCIALCIVIL 3,200 0.169 0.375 0 1 
ENGNDREG 3,200 0.019 0.137 0 1 
FRENDISLM  3,200 0.107 0.309 0 1 
ENGNDISLM   3,200 0.075 0.264 0 1 
ENGNDCIVIL 3,200 0.057 0.231 0 1 
STRIVPR 3,200 5.228 2.381 0 12 
VOCAACC 3,200 -0.071 0.955 -2.224 1.826 
REGQULT 3,200 0.039 0.947 -2.413 2.247 
CONCORR 3,200 -0.048 1.023 -2.057 2.586 
POWDIST 3,200 6.779 1.829 0 10 
INDIVID 3,200 3.676 2.047 0 9.5 
MASCULI 3,200 4.927 1.615 0 10 
UNCAVOD 3,200 6.464 2.038 0 10 
FORDINV 3,200 8.56 32.5 -29.7 734 












Table 4: Correlation matrices between socio-economic factors and issuance and identity of CGGs for 160 countries over the period from 1995-2014 




 ISSUANCE IDENTITY LEGORIG STRIVPR VOCAACC REGQULT CONCORR POWDIST INDIVID MASCULI UNCAVOD FORDINV FINAAID 
ISSUANCE 1.000 
                          
IDENTITY 0.386*** 1.000            
 0.000 
            
LEGORIG 0.225*** 0.051* 1.000           
 0.000 0.004 
           
STRIVPR 0.302*** 0.117*** 0.268*** 1.000          
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
          
VOCAACC 0.334*** 0.150*** 0.175*** 0.443*** 1.000         
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
         
REGQULT 0.360*** 0.072* 0.130*** 0.560*** 0.721*** 1.000        
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
        
CONCORR 0.364*** 0.099*** 0.170*** 0.474*** 0.794*** 0.791*** 1.000       
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
POWDIST -0.294*** -0.107*** -0.190*** -0.220*** -0.496*** -0.451*** -0.511*** 1.000      
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
INDIVID 0.427*** 0.128*** 0.135*** 0.243*** 0.595*** 0.541*** 0.569*** -0.559*** 1.000     
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
MASCULI 0.129*** 0.154*** 0.122*** 0.022 0.003 0.022 -0.027 0.024 0.146*** 1.000    
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.222 0.883 0.205 0.121 0.168 0.000 
    
UNCAVOD -0.091*** -0.134*** -0.336*** -0.072*** 0.104*** 0.040** -0.044** 0.149*** 0.058*** -0.036** 1.000   
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.012 0.000 0.001 0.044 
   
FORDINV 0.565*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.219*** 0.215*** 0.292*** 0.295*** -0.190*** 0.317*** 0.082*** -0.091*** 1.000  
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
FINAAID -0.051*** 0.060*** -0.061*** -0.116*** -0.248*** -0.274*** -0.287*** 0.125*** -0.172*** 0.042** -0.048*** -0.063*** 1.000 




Table 5: The results of OLS and Fixed-effect estimations to examine the effects of socio-economic 
factors on the number of CGGs developed over 1995-2014 for 160 countries 
Number of Codes (ISSUANCE) 
OLS Regression Fixed-Effect Model 
Coef t P>t Coef t P>t 
ENGCLAW 0.890 5.420 0.000*** 0.890 7.180 0.000*** 
FRENCIVIL 0.683 6.060 0.000*** 0.683 5.590 0.000*** 
SPANCIVIL 0.348 3.050 0.007*** 0.348 3.740 0.000*** 
PORTCIVIL  1.160 4.780 0.000*** 1.160 6.100 0.000*** 
GERMCIVIL  0.081 0.710  0.486 0.081 0.750   0.451 
SOCIALCIVIL -0.510 -9.240 0.000*** -0.510 -6.040 0.000*** 
ENGNDREG -0.836 -4.800 0.000*** -0.836 -4.880 0.000*** 
FRENDISLM  -0.030 -0.250  0.804 -0.030 -0.280   0.781 
ENGNDISLM   0.290 3.200 0.005*** 0.290 2.340   0.019** 
ENGNDCIVIL 0.646 8.930 0.000*** 0.646 6.960 0.000*** 
STRIVPR 0.111 3.130 0.006*** 0.111 3.970 0.000*** 
VOCAACC -0.025 -0.340  0.736 -0.025 -0.380   0.705 
REGQULT 0.276 2.330  0.031** 0.276 2.430   0.015** 
CONCORR 0.016 0.250  0.805 0.016 0.130   0.893 
POWDIST -0.058 -3.230 0.004*** -0.058 -3.130 0.002*** 
INDIVID 0.320 5.400 0.000*** 0.320 6.870 0.000*** 
MASCULI 0.105 4.340 0.000*** 0.105 5.420 0.000*** 
UNCAVOD 0.010 0.900  0.378 0.010 0.810   0.421 
FORDINV 0.001 6.130 0.000*** 0.002 8.070 0.000*** 
FINAAID 0.001 3.050 0.007*** 0.001 6.130 0.000*** 
Intercept -1.077 -4.320 0.000*** -1.077 -5.220 0.000*** 
N of observations 3,200   3,200   
F, Prob > F 210.71    0.000*** 29.42  0.000*** 
R-squared 0.421   0.101   
Adj R-squared 0.419     0.095     









Table 6: The results of multinomial logistic regression to examine the effects of socio-economic factors on the type of Identity issued first codes for 
160 countries over the period 1995-2014 
Isomorphism Groups Coercive Groups Normative Groups Mimetic Group 
Type of Issuer 
(Identity) 
Stock  Investors’ 
Association 
Government 
Directors’  Professional  Managers’ 
Association Exchanges Association Association 
  Coef P>t Coef P>t Coef P>t Coef P>t Coef P>t Coef P>t 
ENGCLAW 0.888 0.025** -13.137 0.487 -0.671 0.003*** -1.833 0.000*** -2.522 0.952 8.867 0.843 
FRENCIVIL -0.073 0.865 0.565 0.528 0.432 0.051* -1.888 0.000*** -1.044 0.982 8.204 0.855 
SPANCIVIL -0.610 0.162 -11.198 0.479 0.248 0.346 -0.673 0.130 21.379 0.610 -1.597 0.984 
PORTCIVIL  -0.610 0.244 -4.566 0.623 -0.532 0.081* -8.747 0.394 18.569 0.658 -1.947 0.986 
GERMCIVIL  0.600 0.159 0.778 0.474 -2.279 0.000*** 0.152 0.747 3.779 0.928 8.570 0.848 
SOCIALCIVIL 0.472 0.227 -12.342 0.001*** -1.450 0.000*** -9.482 0.053* -3.300 0.942 -0.138 0.998 
ENGNDREG -0.690 0.282 -9.429 0.909 -1.106 0.017** -0.074 0.918 2.013 0.990 -1.162 0.992 
FRENDISLM  0.437 0.313 -2.948 0.855 -1.480 0.000*** -0.453 0.429 11.969 0.775 10.269 0.819 
ENGNDISLM   0.863 0.040** 0.034 0.976 -1.056 0.000*** 0.210 0.688 4.986 0.923 11.429 0.799 
ENGNDCIVIL 1.091 0.012** -8.104 0.782 0.511 0.061* 0.382 0.409 2.587 0.966 0.485 0.994 
STRIVPR 0.109 0.001*** 0.625 0.000*** 0.043 0.177 -0.096 0.207 -0.896 0.000*** -0.068 0.426 
VOCAACC 0.040 0.776 3.765 0.000*** 0.323 0.007*** 2.678 0.000*** 3.044 0.000*** 1.210 0.001*** 
REGQULT 1.221 0.000*** 1.216 0.060* -0.709 0.000*** -0.884 0.005*** -1.191 0.008*** 0.050 0.896 
CONCORR -0.501 0.001*** -4.559 0.000*** 0.252 0.069* 0.133 0.652 -0.118 0.831 -0.371 0.252 
POWDIST 0.005 0.907 -1.485 0.000*** -0.083 0.041** 0.761 0.000*** 2.419 0.000*** 0.212 0.064* 
INDIVID -0.061 0.146 2.064 0.000*** 0.004 0.909 -0.153 0.022** -0.755 0.000*** -0.046 0.595 
MASCULI -0.127 0.000*** 0.616 0.000*** -0.027 0.498 0.317 0.000*** 2.954 0.000*** -0.290 0.002*** 
UNCAVOD 0.220 0.000*** -1.119 0.000*** 0.131 0.000*** -0.287 0.000*** 3.146 0.000*** 0.121 0.212 
FORDINV 0.001 0.000*** 0.001 0.000*** 0.001 0.000*** 0.001 0.000*** 0.001 0.000*** 0.001 0.000*** 
FINAAID 0.001 0.000*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.001 0.000*** 0.001 0.000*** 0.001 0.000*** 0.001 0.213 
Intercept -3.384 0.000*** -16.390 0.000*** -0.685 0.139 -7.699 0.000*** 6.643 0.875 -11.64 0.795 
N of observations 3,200  3,200   3,200  3,200   3,200   3,200  
Chi2, Prob> chi2 2936.4 0.000*** 2936.4 0.000*** 2936.4 0.000*** 2936.4 0.000*** 2936.4 0.000*** 2936.4 0.000*** 
Pseudo R2 0.314   0.314   0.314   0.314   0.314   0.314   
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
 
